This paper challenges the long-standing emphasis in the developmental state literature on the powerful pilot agency as an essential component of industrialization. While a pilot agency may be able to facilitate growth in mature industries, we argue that policy-makers seeking to promote rapid innovation-based competition must instead rely on continuous, radical policy innovation. We argue that this kind of experimentation is more likely to occur at the periphery of the public sector, in agencies with few hard resources and limited political prestige. In addition to providing a novel interpretation of how states enter new, high technology markets, we explain why some successful countries become less innovative over time. As agencies successfully introduce radical policy innovations, their higher profile exposes them to greater political interference and reduces their entrepreneurial capacity. The argument is supported by within-case analysis of two historically low-technology economies that successfully promoted rapid innovation-based growth, Finland and Israel.
Introduction
The state features prominently in literature on economic development. The 'developmental' state literature asserts that late developers require an autonomous, powerful, and centralized bureaucracy to industrialize (Chibber, 2002; Doner, Ritchie, & Slater, 2005; Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990) . Recent work on the 'neo-developmental' state asserts that such agencies are more effective when embedded in multiple domestic or international networks (Ansell, 2000; Block, 2008; Evans, 1995; O'Riain, 2004) . Both literatures situate developmental agencies at the center of the public sector and the economy more generally.
While such agencies may facilitate competition in mature industries with clear technological trajectories, we argue that policy-makers seeking to facilitate rapid innovation-based (RIB) competition must instead rely on a very different kind of organization.
We begin with the observation that the promotion of RIB growth requires a 'Schumpeterian developmental agency,' (SDA) committed to a process of continuous policy experimentation (Kuznetsov, 2009) . In contrast to the literatures on the development and neodevelopmental state, we argue that this type of radical innovation is more likely to occur at the periphery of the public sector, in low-profile agencies with relatively few hard resources and limited political prestige. These peripheral agencies are less vulnerable to political interference and more likely to adopt experimental policies that promote RIB growth. In identifying the circumstances under which agencies are more likely to engage in policy experimentation, we not only advance a novel explanation for how late developers can promote disruptive technological innovation, but also reveal why successful agencies become less entrepreneurial over time.
We develop the argument in five stages. Section one introduces the literature on the developmental and neo-developmental state. Section two defines the SDA and explains why radical policy innovation is more likely to occur at the periphery of the public sector. Section three and four illustrate the argument by analyzing how two historically, low-technology, late developers, Finland and Israel, assumed leadership in new, RIB industries. In these two, very different cases, SDAs, the Finnish Fund for Research and Development (Sitra) and the Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS) in the Israeli Ministry of Trade and Industry, played a crucial role in stimulating co-evolutionary change by precipitating policy experimentation and RIB growth.
1 Within-case analysis, based on 229 interviews conducted between 2000 and 2012, reveals that these innovative agencies were located at the periphery of the public sector and became progressively less entrepreneurial over time as increasing success exposed them to greater political interference. We conclude by generalizing the argument to a broader universe of cases.
The Developmental State: Centralization, Capital Accumulation and Catch-Up
The state has long played a central role in governing the economy. This is particularly true in capital-scarce developing countries, where economists have argued that states can promote industrialization through import-substituting industrialization, subsidization, credit rationing and public procurement. Political scientists, inspired by East Asian industrialization, have asserted that such policies are most effective when implemented by an autonomous, coherent and centralized bureaucracy (Chibber, 2002; Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990) . The developmental state requires a powerful pilot agency, "outside and astride" traditional ministries to mobilize and allocate capital (Doner, et al., 2005, p. 334; Weiss, 1998, p. 52) . Such agencies are better positioned to resist special interests and coordinate across different sectors and industries (Chibber, 2002, p. 955; Johnson, 1982, pp. 315-320; Woo-Cumings, 1999, p. 13 ).
These traditional pilot agencies enabled several East Asian economies to catch up to their developed counterparts in established, capital-intensive medium-technology industries such as steel, ship-building and automotives (Amsden, 1989; Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990) .
These hierarchical agencies were perceived as less effective in RIB industries, however, stifling the flow of information and inhibiting experimentation (Katz, 1998; Wong, 2011) . As a result, a more recent literature on the 'neo-developmental' state emphasizes a different pattern of state-industry relations, in which pilot agencies are embedded within multiple domestic and international networks (Ansell, 2000; Evans, 1995; O'Riain, 2004) . This multiply embedded structure enables policy-makers to more effectively gather information and coordinate action across different actors and sectors, while simultaneously reducing their dependence on special interests. This network-oriented literature thus re-interprets East Asian catch-up and proposes to explain how countries can compete at the technological frontier, and in high technology industries in particular (Block, 2008; O'Riain, 2004) .
While the literature on the neo-developmental state enhances our understanding of state-society relations, it presents an incomplete picture of how states promote RIB growth.
Even with this new emphasis on networked governance, many scholars focus on the same, powerful, pilot agency that featured so prominently in earlier literature on the developmental state. While such scholars reject a command-based structure in favor of horizontal networks, they situate powerful developmental agencies at the center of those networks (Ansell, 2000, p. 307; O'Riain, 2004, p. 148; Rodrik, 2007, p. 113) . 2 For such scholars, the biggest threat to the neo-developmental state is that it may become too fragmented, inhibiting effective policy formulation (Negoita, 2011, p. 92; O'Riain, 2004, p. 37) . In practice, we claim that the opposite is true. While a core, powerful networked developmental agency may use information to more effectively implement traditional industrial policies, its central location can hinder policy experimentation and RIB growth. 
Schumpeterian Developmental Agencies, Policy Entrepreneurship and Rapid

Innovation-Based Competition
To understand why centrally positioned agencies may hinder innovation, it is important to recognize that RIB competition confronts policy-makers (and firms) with fundamentally new challenges. At the technological frontier, and in RIB industries in particular, products and industries are intrinsically uncertain and continually evolving.
Indeed, if novel technology is the objective, then long-term planning based on the ideas that markets and products are already known is not applicable (Breznitz, 2007b, p. 15) . Successful intervention requires policy-makers to launch experimental policy measures to target nonexistent industries and activities. Experimentation is also continual in that policy-makers must be prepared to cull the inevitable failures and abandon even successful policy measures to create space for new ones (Rodrik, 2007, pp. 114-117) . In short, RIB promotion requires a 'Schumpeterian' developmental agency (SDA) charged with continually identifying radically new policy proposals to destabilize and transform the public and private sectors (Kuznetsov, 2009 ).
We argue that this experimental process is less likely to occur in powerful pilot agencies at the core of the public sector. Radical innovation is instead more common along the periphery, in agencies with relatively few hard resources and, just as importantly, little prestige. This peripheral location facilitates policy innovation in three ways. First, agencies at the periphery of the public sector with relatively few concrete resources and little prestige are an unlikely target for political interference by established public or private sector interests.
Because they control fewer resources and are deemed less important, these agencies are less vulnerable to lobbying by special interest groups. The political profile of the peripheral agency thus enables policy-makers to experiment with novel and risky initiatives targeted at new activities and industries. (Breznitz, 2007b; Ornston, forthcoming) .
In examining these two critical cases, we use most different and most similar systems analysis to increase analytic leverage. The fact that Finland and Israel differ along multiple dimensions enables us to address alternative explanations such as bureaucratic quality, the structure of the national innovation system and the influence of large firms. In Finland, for example, one of the highest-quality, Weberian-ideal bureaucracies in the world is embedded within a centralized, neo-corporatist innovation system dominated by a handful of large firms (Ali-Yrkkö & Hermans, 2004; Kaufman, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2003; Ornston, forthcoming) .
Israel, by contrast, rivals Greece in measures of government effectiveness and possesses a highly fragmented innovation system populated by start-ups and smaller firms (Breznitz, 2007a; Evans & Rauch, 1999; Kaufman, et al., 2003; Teubal, 1983 Teubal, , 1993 (Ali-Yrkkö & Hermans, 2004; Häikiö, 2002; Rehn, 1996) . This section focuses specifically on innovation policy, where analysis has privileged national, neocorporatist bodies such as the Science and Technology Policy Council and large, well-funded agencies such as Tekes (Moen & Lilja, 2005; Rehn, 1996) . While these peak-level bodies were integral in scaling new policies (Ornston, forthcoming), we claim that the initiatives they adopted were actually pioneered by Sitra, a small think tank at the periphery of the public sector. As Sitra's programs were poached by more powerful actors, it launched new initiatives to transform the Finnish innovation system. At the same time, Sitra's growing prominence threatens its status as a disruptive agent.
Sitra as a SDA: From Industrial Policy to Innovation Policy
Historically, Finland possessed one of the lowest-technology economies in the OECD. Even 'high-technology' companies such as Nokia derived half of their international revenue from non-competitive, bilateral trade with the USSR (Steinbock, 2000, p. 28) . Public policy reinforced this reliance on low-and medium-technology industry. For example, the Bank of Finland, in close collaboration with the major banking blocs, incentivized investment in capital-intensive industries by fixing interest rates below market-clearing levels, strategically allocating foreign exchange and repeatedly devaluing the currency (Rehn, 1996, pp. 230-231) . While governed by different actors, industrial policy exhibited similar characteristics. The powerful Ministry of Trade and Industry (KTM) used grant aid and created state-owned enterprises to successfully target mature, capital-intensive manufacturing industries such as copper, steel and chemicals (Rehn, 1996, pp. 278-282) . Public support for research was so underdeveloped that policy-makers would later propose stripping KTM of its responsibilities in this space (Murto, Niemelä, & Laamanen, 2006, p. 41) .
Policy innovation instead originated at the periphery of the public sector within a small foundation, Sitra. Proposed by the Bank of Finland and approved by parliament, the Finnish National Fund for Research and Development was established in 1968 to celebrate the Finnish parliament's 50 th anniversary. Like many other Finnish initiatives, the idea was imported from Sweden, which had just established the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (Murto, et al., 2006, p. 30) . Sitra was established with a much broader mandate to promote the competitiveness of the Finnish economy, reflecting both a growing consensus about the inflationary consequences of the devaluation cycle and continued disagreement about how to escape it (Authors' Interview, Finland, June 20 2012). Sitra's budget, however, was modest, as the agency operated off the interest from its 145 million Euro endowment (Murto, et al., 2006, p. 31) .
While formally supervised by the Bank of Finland, Sitra's modest budget and unconventional mandate effectively insulated it from political interference. In the words of one former executive:
We were very free. We had a lot of leeway and a lot of space to maneuver within… The central bank had other things to do. They didn't care about this small organization. As a result, the bureaucracy wasn't there. The state oversight wasn't there the same way it would later become (Authors' Interview, Finland, June 14 2012) Sitra's peripheral position facilitated radical policy innovation in two ways. First, Sitra was forced to develop alternative strategies as larger, more powerful actors such as KTM and the Bank of Finland monopolized traditional instruments such as the state-owned enterprise and credit rationing. Inspired by his extensive international contacts, Sitra's first president, Klaus Waris, instead sought to promote entrepreneurship by using grants and soft loans to co-finance risky long-term research by private corporations (Murto, et al., 2006, p. 31 ). Sitra's lower political profile also enabled the organization to target non-traditional, private actors. Established industries, focused on more lucrative funding opportunities at the Bank of Finland and KTM, were strikingly underrepresented in early funding rounds. During the first ten years, over one quarter of Sitra's funds were allocated to electronics, far out of proportion to the industry's significance in the Finnish economy (Murto, et al., 2006, p. 70) .
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Lacking capital, the organization instead sought to raise awareness about a new, R&D-intensive developmental model by writing reports and inviting elites to participate in courses on economic policy (Moen & Lilja, 2005, p. 373) . These efforts bore fruit in the early 1980s, not because of an emerging high-technology coalition (which was still in its infancy), but rather because of deteriorating economic performance and geopolitical vulnerability. 6 The OPEC-induced oil crises of the 1970s increased bilateral trade with the Soviet Union to worrisome levels, while high-profile failures in electronics delegitimized traditional industrial policies (Sabel & Saxenian, 2008, p. 61 (Häikiö, 2002, p. 98) , and it sustained research spending as Nokia flirted with bankruptcy in the early 1990s (Häikiö, 2002, p. 142) . 7 Nokia's widely documented transformation from a medium-sized, diversified conglomerate into a high-technology giant, however, obscures the next round of experimental policies that were being developed at the periphery of the Finnish public and private sector.
Ongoing Experimentation: From Research and Development to Risk Capital
While the decision to establish a much larger agency dedicated to research threatened Sitra, it also forced the organization to develop new policies that would advance industrial restructuring. To identify new instruments, Sitra policy-makers looked beyond the large enterprises that they had worked with in the 1970s (which were now focused on Tekes) and (Luukkonen, 2006, p. 6) and worked with private sector venture capitalists to lobby politicians, KTM, pension funds, insurance companies and other major investors (Authors ' Interview, Finland, 20 November 2006) . By the early 1990s, Sitra had pioneered a new model that could be copied and scaled by national politicians as a severe recession and banking crisis delegitimized established policy routines and industries. The financial crisis of the early 1990s shifted attention away from large conglomerates to smaller and medium-sized enterprises, both because this sector was more heavily affected by the ensuing credit crunch and because it was seen as the principle source of employment growth. In this environment, Sitra was prepared to offer a radically different strategy to promote growth. Kera, a regional development fund, was the first to copy Sitra by launching the first dedicated public VC fund, Start Fund of Kera (SFK) in 1991. In 1995, parliament established an even larger fund, Finnish Industry Investment (FII), under the supervision of KTM (Luukkonen, 2006, p. 6 ).
Together with a successful campaign to woo institutional investors, these initiatives dramatically increased VC investment in Finland (Luukkonen, 2006, p. 11 (Boutin, 2010) . In challenging the R&D supply-side focused policies of the 1980s and 1990s, these shocks precipitated a significant shift in Finnish innovation policy.
Like the initial movement into risk capital, recent institutional innovations can be traced back to Sitra. The creation of FII and an increasingly vibrant private sector led Sitra to exit from the VC industry. From 1996, Sitra shifted its role from a direct provider of capital to a network-building, providing planning assistance to firms, launched a networking service to link firms with business angels, and matching young enterprises with experienced managers (Luukkonen, 2006, p. 9 ). Sitra's new role in the VC industry reflected a broader shift away from the provision of hard resources toward the coordination of various actors in the innovation process, particularly end-users and citizens (Hämäläinen & Heiskala, 2007) .
Sitra adopted the concept of "social innovation" in 1999 and subsequently launched initiatives in areas as diverse as health care, municipal reform and energy efficiency who had done something for a political party and were left without a job were given a room at Sitra and were given a title" (Authors' Interview, Finland, 14 June 2012). revised its strategy to "recapture" its initial focus on "radical innovation" (Authors'
Interview, Finland, 13 June 2012). 9 Such efforts are complicated by the fact that the organization is now under pressure to tackle similarly high-profile and politicized topics such as public sector reform and workplace cooperation. To demonstrate that these dynamics are not unique to Finland, we now turn to another agency operating in a very different political and bureaucratic environment.
Israel: 'Science' as an Anchor of Radical Policy Experimentation
Today Israel is considered an ICT powerhouse with more companies listed on the NASDAQ than any other country bar the USA. The Israeli ICT industry is based on an R&D-intensive, novel product-based, export-oriented business model. 10 Looking at this impressive record raises a question: how did Israel, a country that as late as 1965 (Katchalski, 1968) 
OCS as a SDA: Conceptualizing "Science-Based Industry"
Similarly to Finland, most financial institutions in Israel until the mid-1990s were unwilling to sponsor new technology-based firms. As in Finland, experimentation was precipitated by geopolitical vulnerability and dependence on foreign countries. In the Israeli case, a French military embargo led policy-makers to channel large investments and R&D into military high-technology efforts. 11 Similar changes followed in civilian industrial policy.
The most important was the establishment of the OCS in the then Ministry of Commerce. It might be hard for followers of current Israeli innovation policies to imagine, but in the beginning the OCS was so marginal that the position was filled by a university professor that came to the office only twice a week. Many of the earlier employees of the OCS, however, described its actions as intensive networking aimed at broadly infusing an R&D-based development ideology into the private industry. Like Sitra, the OCS's limited resources meant that its only hope to infuse industrial transformation as a peripheral agency was by educating and mobilizing more central actors into action. The resources given to the OCS were so small that Yaakov commented in an interview:
The small budget had a few reasons, most importantly was that nearly everyone in the Ministry did not understand what is it that they were supposed to be doing. A new R&D law in 1984 stipulated that the OCS would have an "unconstrained" annual budget for its main R&D fund, so all approved projects suggested by private industry to develop high-technology products would be supported. This was possible because the overall demand for R&D funding in Israel was still miniscule. As soon as the industry grew and become successful a budgetary limit was reintroduced.
Many of these new projects proved to be successful in international markets, as evidenced by the rising amount recouped by the OCS as payment for successful projects:
from a mere eight million dollars in 1988 to $139 million in 1999. These payments were immediately injected into the industry, continuing this growth cycle until the mid-1990s.
Figure 1 below shows the rapid growth of the OCS annual budget from both governmental allocations and royalties in this period. The influence of the OCS' extended activities on industrial sector innovative outputs is well documented .
<<Figure 2 The Rise of the OCS 1990 to 1999>>
By the late 1980s and continuing at a higher rate in the 1990s, a transformation (Breznitz 2007) .
Rapid Growth and Ongoing Experimentation from R&D Grants to the Creation of Risk Capital
In 1989 the USSR started to break apart, and Jews who had been previously unable to emigrate started moving to Israel in large numbers. This wave was perceived to bring the best and the brightest technologically educated workforce from the USSR and, together with the thousands of engineers who were made redundant by the defense industry, raised the question of how to tap this body of knowledge. 14 While this convergence was a historical accident, the OCS's two decades of patiently developing and introducing policies using an HTP framework established an alternative model that shaped Israel's S&T policies. The large injection of U.S financial aid aimed at helping supposedly technologically savvy new immigrants to settle in Israel had created a window of opportunity for the OCS.
In an almost ideal example of how a peripheral agency with an arsenal of ideas can utilize its network to get small amounts of capital to start programs that proved critical in stimulating private industry change, the OCS pushed forward three programs that it had been arguing for years. The OCS' peripheral status was the main reason why it had multiple innovative policy programs ideas, since it led it to link with diverse groups of heterogeneous and less mainstream social scientists, economist, industrialists, and like-minded civil servants from around the world. Indeed, the ideas for the three programs came from as far away as the U.S. and Japan. Many of these ideas, especially the MAGNET research consortia program, came from a group of academics facilitated by the Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies that has been working closely with the OCS to develop new policy tools based on international comparison of best practices (Brodet, Justman, & Teubal, 1990; Justman, Zuscovitch, & Teubal, 1993 The second program, Yozma, started operations in 1992 and kick-started the Israeli VC industry. This time, the OCS decided that the necessary skills and knowledge did not exist in Israel and that, in order to succeed, the VC industry needed strong networks with foreign financial markets rather than the Tel Aviv Stock exchange. Accordingly, Yozma was created as a government VC fund of $100 million that had two functions. The first was to invest $8 million in ten private venture funds, which would be 40% or less of the total capital-the rest was provided by other private limited partners. To get this financing, the funds' managers had to secure investment and partnership from at least one local and one years, and all IP outputs were shared among the consortium members, who also had to agree to license this IP to Israeli companies at a cost that did not reflect monopoly status.
The success of these policies and the rapid rise of the ICT industry moved hightechnology industry to the center stage of Israel's economy. Yozma proved to be so successful that it became a model (with only limited success) for VC policy worldwide.
Today the Israeli VC industry is considered the most advanced and sophisticated in the world outside the U.S., with many top US and global funds starting operations in Israel. 16 However, this success and the growing centrality of the high-technology industry to the Israeli economy also made it the center of political interest, and severely limited the ability of the OCS to introduce new policy innovation. Since 1991, the OCS was allowed to launch only one new program to target a new policy domain, traditional industry, and this new program did not get new budget allocation but needed to be self-financed from the OCS's diminishing resources. As in Finland, while there are excellent reasons to build on a country's existing strengths, this incremental strategy and orientation toward established firms nonetheless encapsulates the OCS weakened capacity as an agent of radical policy innovation.
The Price of Success -Political Interference and Inter-Agency Encroachment in the 2000s
If the 1990s were the decade in which the OCS received praise and elevated social Editors, 2000; Peretz, 2002; Rolinik, 2002) More recently, in July 2010, the Ministry of Finance inserted a regulation to the annual state budget that would have prevented the OCS from sponsoring any R&D activities conducted by 'large companies' where large was defined very modestly as companies with more than $100 million in annual sales (Grimeland & Coren, 2010) . Whether that proposition would become a permanent law or not is less important than the fact that this is just another indication for the constant interference of other units not only in the OCS decisions but also in the basic professional judgments the OCS is allowed to use in order to fulfill its mission statement. It is becoming clear that in its old domain, new technology-based companies, the OCS' ability to act as an SDA was reduced as this sector became economically important and politically salient.
The OCS has responded to these limitations by experimenting in new domains.
Several top officials, together with some leading academics, such as Manuel Trajtenberg, have started to argue that there is an over-focus of the Israel industry on ICT, with the very low spillovers and linkages between the ICT R&D-producing sector and the rest of the economy (Breznitz, 2007b; OCS, 2010; . In order to foster these linkages and maximize R&D across the business sector, starting in 2005 the OCS has allocated its internal budget to a new program focusing on a new set of private actors, traditional industry.
The program tries to tackle these issues from both the demand-side (educating firms on how to conduct and utilize R&D), and the supply-side by offering incentives and grants for both graduate level STEM students and R&D engineers, to work in or conduct research on SMEs in traditional industries. The program has grown steadily in the last five years and led a significant number of firms from traditional industries to apply for OCS grants for the first time (OCS, 2010) . While the OCS has thus successfully engaged traditional industry, it has nonetheless proven less successful in targeting emerging, RIB industries. Furthermore, with a steadily declining budget and constant political interference from both politicians and other (more powerful) agencies, the OCS has found it more difficult to scale its initiatives.
Conclusion: The Future of the Developmental State
In describing how Finland and Israel entered new, high technology industries, we have highlighted how reform-oriented policy-makers can facilitate RIB competition. We argued that such initiatives are most likely to emerge not from commanding or centrally positioned agencies but rather from more modest organizations at the periphery of the public sector. This observation can be generalized beyond Finland and Israel to other economies. In the United States, for example, some of the most flexible and innovative agencies, such as DARPA, have also occupied a relatively low political profile (Whitford & Schrank, 2011, p. 279) . In Ireland, a paradigmatic neo-developmental state (O'Riain, 2004) , virtually all of the policy innovations that supported the indigenous high tech sector were developed and originally implemented by two marginal divisions, the Enterprise Development Program and the International Service Program (both run by the same personnel) and a small but highly entrepreneurial sub-agency, the National Software Directorate (NSD) within the powerful Industrial Developmental Authority (O'Riain, 2004; Sterne, 2004) . Ironically, strengthening these innovative agencies proved deeply problematic. Contrary to neo-developmental theory (O'Riain, 2004) , the creation of a central, high-profile agency, Enterprise Ireland, dedicated to the promotion of indigenous industry stifled policy innovation after 1998 (Breznitz, 2007b, p. 169) . While for some years thereafter the NSD was permitted to expand established grant making programs as well as its VC development initiative, policy experimentation ceased, negatively affecting the growth of the Irish software industry (Breznitz, 2012, p. 106 (Fuchs, 2010) .
It is also worth noting that Schumpeterian strategies impose costs even where they are most successful. While Finland and Israel stimulated RIB growth, restructuring exposed the Finland to adverse economic shocks and Israel to distributive conflict. For policy-makers seeking to promote rapid restructuring, however, this paper contains some clear policy implications. Instead of strengthening established developmental agencies at the core of the public sector or embedding them more tightly within public and private sector networks, policy-makers may be better off turning to peripheral low-profile agencies, giving them a mandate to engage in continuous policy experimentation, imbuing them with managerial slack and shielding them from political encroachment. Note: payback are the total amount the OCS inject back to the budget from the royalties gained on past grants, government budget allocation is the total sum of approved annual budget allocation to the OCS from the Ministry of Finance 1 Our argument thus supports recent literature on endogenously generated institutional path change (Schneiberg, 2007) . Unlike Schneiberg, however, who describes how "failed" battles leave behind alternative models that change the flow of the dominant path by acting as flotsam and jetsam, we view SDAs as a seeding source. SDAs propose and test models in the "shadows" that later enter the mainstream (in ways that ultimately hinder the experimental capacity of these agencies).
2 This emphasis on pilot agencies is true in all case studies of emerging economies, although in the specific case of the United States, some scholars have suggested that lower profile agencies may be more insulated from "market fundamentalism" (Block, 2008) . We argue that this is not unique to liberal economies, but extends to other forms of political interference as well.
3 Some neo-developmental scholars have specifically argued that decentralized political systems are more conducive to experimentation (Sabel & Saxenian, 2008; Whitford & Schrank, 2011) . We advance a different argument about individual agencies, however, and, in so doing, highlight a surprising capacity for radical policy innovation, even within highly centralized political and economic systems such as Finland. 4 It is important to note that we do not argue that RIB development is state-planned. Our argument is that public agencies can play a crucial role in stimulating and sustaining the coevolutionary development of public policy and private industry that characterizes RIB growth and that peripheral public agencies are more likely to play that role.
5 Nokia's small electronics division was an early beneficiary of these funds in the 1960s and 1970s. This occurred at a time when the company's top management was still focused on exporting low-and medium-technology products to the Soviet Union (Murto, et al., 2006, p. 70; Steinbock, 2000, p. 28) 6 High technology firms were still politically marginalized at this time, with one industrialist famously declaring that Finland should export nothing "smaller than a horse" (Authors'
Interview, Finland, 10 November 2005). 7 As recently as 1991, Nokia was in such dire straits that its owners famously offered to sell the conglomerate to Ericsson for one dollar. Ericsson declined to purchase the firm, precisely because of Nokia's troubled consumer electronics division, which would later lead Nokia into mobile telecommunication (Häikiö, 2002, p. 142) .
8 While some scholars fault the centralization of the Finnish innovation system (Sabel & Saxenian, 2008) , this viewpoint obscures the fact that Finnish economic policy was always centralized and, by virtually all accounts, is far more pluralistic today.
9 Since Tekes is also considerably younger than Sitra, this suggests that experimental capacity is not simply a function of 'newness' or the life cycle of an agency.
10 For more on the history of the ICT industry in Israel, see (Avnimelech & Teubal, 2004; Breznitz, 2006 Breznitz, , 2007b Teubal & Spiller, 1977) 11 France was Israel's main source of armaments and research collaboration until de Gaulle became president. Israel's supposedly historic alliance with the US did not fully commenced until the 1973 war.
12 The view at the time was that industrial R&D was the domain of the public research institutions. Indeed, the official mission of the Katchalski committee, which is credited with creating the OCS, was to improve those institutions.
13 Yaakov was also a protégé of Katchalski, who was then serving as the President of Israel.
After leaving the OCS Yaakov served as a special advisor of the World Bank to Taiwan and South Korea at the time they went through their rapid high-technology industrialization period.
14 While the wave of immigration from the former USSR created the pretext with which the OCS was able to secure finance and political agreement to start these four programs, the Russian immigrants themselves have not, thus far, become successful technological
